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COMMENTARY
Without Improved Security, Biodefense Laboratories 
May Double as Arsenals for Terrorists
Jim Shen
An American public, already edgy from the September 11*’’ attacks, quickly found itself 
having to deal with another terrorist attack in the form of the so-called “Amerithrax” attacks of 
September and October 2001. Five were killed and 17 fell ill to anthrax distributed via United 
States mail.* The federal government responded by spending generously on anti-bioterrorism 
measures, such as the construction of biodefense research laboratories. Programs such as Pro­
ject Bioshield, which devoted $5.6 billion to fighting “potential agents of bioterror,” illustrated 
President Bush’s commitment to develop countermeasures against potential biological attack.^ 
In all, $41 billion has been spent on bioterror research since 2002.^ Private companies, which 
had previously considered this research unprofitable, joined in with their own biodefense re­
search ventures."*
However, despite the rapid proliferation of these laboratories and the large amount of fund­
ing allocated to them, security measures and oversight remain inadequate. A 2008 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that the federal government was unaware of the 
number of BSL-3 laboratories - the class of biosafety laboratory at which potentially lethal 
pathogens are studied - that even existed.^’^ A 2004 survey was able to identify 598 laboratories 
at 245 facilities reporting BSL-3 capability. Furthermore, this figure likely underestimates the 
actual number of BSL-3 laboratories, as more than half of the contacted facilities did not re­
spond and no federal facilities were surveyed at all.^ To be sure, the amount of laboratory space 
is considerable. The 2008 GAO report also pointed out poor perimeter security measures at two 
BSL-4 laboratories. Because BSL-4 laboratories study potentially lethal pathogens for which
there is no vaccine or cure, they require even stricter
(security measures than the BSL-3 laboratories.^ Yet, 
one of the two BSL-4 laboratories had no security 
cameras performing any live monitoring at all.^In 2004, more than 
6,000 laboratories 
around the world re­
ceived samples of an 
H2N2 influenza virus 
that was responsible 
for between one and 
four million fatalities 
in the late 1950s."
It is of the utmost importance that the government 
secures these laboratories. If infectious agents were 
to be accidentally released, it would be yet another 
example of a surprisingly comrnon occurrence. In 
2004, more than 6,000 laboratories around the world 
received samples of an H2N2 influenza virus that 
was responsible for between one and four million 
fatalities in the late 1950s.^ Earlier in 2004, employ­
ees of the Children’s Hospital Oaj^land Research In­
stitute in California were accidentally exposed to live 
anthrax.^
If infectious agents were to be weaponized and used in a terrorist attack, the implications 
could be devastating. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have listed anthrax as a 
Category A bioterrorism agent, the most threatening class of bioterrorism agent.'® Releasing a
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few hundred pounds of anthrax into the air over a densely populated area could sicken tens of 
thousands of people.^ Thankfully, weaponizing potentially lethal organisms such as anthrax is a 
project that poses significant technical and logistical obstacles.” However, with a combination 
of poor security and a well-placed accomplice among the 15,000 employees nationwide with 
access to weaponizable pathogens, would-be biological terrorists would find that the hardest 
work has been done Jor them.^
The existence of these vulnerabilities may lead one to question the organizations that are 
responsible for laboratory security. Institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) at BSL-3, BSL-4, 
and other biocontainment laboratories exist to ensure safe operation and oversight in accor­
dance with a set of NIH-established rules called the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Re­
combinant DNA Molecules}^ The NIH stipulates that any institution with at least one NIH- 
fiinded project subject to the Guidelines must adhere to the Guidelines for every other such pro­
ject whether that project receives NIH funding or not.” However, a recent study found that 
many facilities in the private sector were not compliant with this rule. In all, 75% of major pri­
vate biotechnology companies are not overseen by any NIH-recognized IBC at all. Making mat­
ters worse, the laboratories studying the most dangerous agents were not spared from this lack 
of oversight. Of the BSL-3 laboratories identified in this study, 98% had not subjected all of 
their federal BSL-3 research grants to IBC review.”
This may be regarded as a natural consequence of the NIH’s reluctance to enforce compli­
ance. As of 2008, the NIH has never withdrawn funding for a project based on an institution’s 
noncompliance with the Guidelines. Even if the NIH began to withdraw funding from noncom- 
pliant institutions, projects funded by non-NIH sources would be unaffected since they lie out­
side the jurisdiction of the Guidelines. Laboratories receiving outside funding are only encour­
aged, but not required, to maintain IBCs.” Clearly, the scope of the IBC system is not sufficient 
to properly oversee all laboratories nationwide studying dangerous agents. The domain of its 
authority is not comprehensive enough and enforcement is lax within that domain.
An expanded biosafety research sector is one of the legacies of the Bush administration. 
Support and criticism for the current scope and nature of federally funded biosafety research 
runs somewhat along partisan lines. However, one thing that all should be able to agree upon is 
that as long as these laboratories exist, they must be secure. Rectifying the current situation is 
not an insignificant task. In addition to the relatively small jobs of constructing more robust pe­
rimeter security measures, larger-scale reforms to the institutions that oversee the operations of 
these laboratories must be enacted. Otherwise, these expensive laboratories would double as 
storehouses of potential weapons to be accidentally or intentionally used against the American 
population. Without proper security, the billions of dollars spent funding these biodefense ef­
forts will have only exacerbated a national security risk.
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